Journal of Scientific Papers


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ISSN 2071-789X

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Strike Plagiarism

  • General Founder and Publisher:

    Centre of Sociological Research


  • Publishing Partners:

    University of Szczecin (Poland)

    Széchenyi István University, (Hungary)

    Mykolas Romeris University (Lithuania)

    Alexander Dubcek University of Trencín (Slovak Republic)

  • Membership:

    American Sociological Association

    European Sociological Association

    World Economics Association (WEA)





Vol. 4, No 1a, 2011




Katarzyna Krot


Abstract. The aim of this article is to explain the essence of the doctor-patient agency relationship in the health care system and to make an attempt to demonstrate the influence of trust on this relationship. Information asymmetry in the doctor-patient relationship and the willingness to decrease the sense of uncertainty may cause both parties to become inclined to abuse (moral hazard). Therefore, it seems that building trust between the doctor and the patient will reduce the effects of this relationship. The qualitative study conducted confirms that limited trust in doctors encourages some subjects to repeat medically unjustified visits to the doctor.


Keywords: health, agency relationship, moral hazard, trust, Poland.


JEL Classification: I11.


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Katarzyna Krot, Ph.D.

Faculty of Management

University of Technology in Bialystok